Thinking about xGW

In my own mind I keep coming back to the accuracy of Generations of War theory.  Purpleslog posted a great roundup of xGW discussion around the blogosphere, proving that no one agrees on what exactly the theory means.

My thoughts have changed over time as well. This was a particularly insightful comment:

Those who fault 4GW for its short comings have a lot of ammunition to support their arguments, but one could argue that the whole generational method to describe warfare is what is at faulty. It assumes that one generation replaces another, but the reality is that 1GW through 5GW are additive, they add to the repetoire (italics added -Steve) of options available. The first step to clarifying the debate is doing away with the generations of warfare, then we won’t have to waste time defending them, and instead can focus on the real issues at hand.

Repetoire is the key word here, as social movement theorists like Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly refers to repetoires of collective action to describe the means chosen by protest movements to achieve their political goals. Perhaps it could also be used to describe strategic paradigms (in the Kuhnian sense) that inform a belligerent about how one should make war. And as per the above quote, each strategic paradigm has been around forever, so each Generation does not evolve to displace each other, but instead merely adds to a belligerent’s repetoire of strategic paradigm. That being said, given one’s place in the social structure of the international political system, employing certain strategic paradigms is politically self-destructive (and irrational) or alternatively can lead to political success (and thus, rational). Thus, most states aren’t supposed to kill civilians, but some do and get away with it as well as the non-state actors they are fighting. These actors can fight one type of war without losing legitimacy, unlike more established states who are deeply embedded in a normative culture that prohibits ‘collateral damage’. Each Generation is a repetoire and has existed throughout time, but just because an actor has learned a repetoire doesn’t mean it can always use it and expect to win. That’s why history is important. It conditions which Generations/repetoires/strategic paradigms will be most successful to achieving one’s policy goals.

 

 

 

 

 

Revolutionary Strategies in Early Christianity

Daniel H. Abbott. Revolutionary Strategies in Early Christianity. Nimble Books, Ann Arbor: 2008.

The one and the only Dan Tdaxp has published his first (and by no means last) book. ‘Revolutionary Strategies’ applies contemporary military theory to the Christianization of the Roman Empire.  Using biblical sources and secondary histories to deduce the strategy of early Christians, Dan argues that the Christian movement adopted a strategy with regards to the Roman Empire that is analogous to 4th Generation War: By loving their enemies (the Romans), the Christians ultimately destroyed the Roman will to resist Christianity.  As Christianity spread throughout the Roman Empire, it came to be seen by the Romans as a useful pillar to uphold the legitimacy and authority of the state as it was confronted by external enemies (re: pesky barbarians).    Thus, Constantine’s vision in 312 comes at a fortuitous time, as Rome was ripe to embrace Christianity, waiting patiently for its embrace. 

The best of Dan’s strategic analysis involves integrating Boyd’s PISRR steps to victory and the gendering of different aspects of war.  PISRR stands for Penetrate-Isolate-Subdue/Subvert-Reorganize-Reharmonize. However, to successfully PISRR an enemy, and harmonize its existence according to one’s own strategy, it is necessary to use both male Panzers and female Soldats.  Panzers crash gates, Soldats build societies.  Using one without the other leaves one strategically vulnerable to further annihalation or eventual subversion.  Femininity and Masculinity go hand in hand in warfare, a velvet glove to an iron fist.  Christian Panzers spread the Good Word, Soldats ensured it stayed in the hearts and minds of the people.  When the Empire was weak, it could switch to a Christian ideology that was already well received among the people.  Thus, Christians destroyed the Roman will to resist it, as it became more rational to embrace it. 

At least that’s what I got out of it (without revealing too much). 

However, no good review should be completely uncritical.  So allow me to pick a fight.  Instead of 4GW, might it be more consistent with xGW to think of this as 5GW? To quote Dan:

“Your enemy must not feel that he is not on your side”.

By loving the Romans and respecting their political rule, the Christians were trying to keep the Romans from perceiving them as enemies, despite the fact that Christian social norms were non-hierarchal (everyone equal in the eyes of God) and threatening to the patriarchal Roman social order. Thus, I see carrying the equipment of Roman soldiers (as instructed by Jesus in Matthew 5:41) as a way to falsify the Roman characterization of Christians as enemies.  Loving your enemy is the best way to make him not think of you as an enemy. 

Either way, this is a sweet book that gets me thinking about xGW in pre-modern terms.  Check it out, and then go read Dan’s blog, Dreaming 5GW, and the blogs of those esteemed contributors. 

The Western Frontier Gets Wilder

Frontier Insurgency Spills into Pakistani City.Jane Perlez, NYT 1/18/07Militants Escape Control in Pakistan” Carlotta Gall and David Rhode, NYT 1/15/07Pakistan Fort Overrun By Militants Ismail Khan, NYT 1/17/07From the Perlez piece,

“It’s asymmetrical warfare against an established state,” said Muhammad Sulaman Khan, chief of operations for the Peshawar police and a close friend of Mr. Saad. “The terrorists only don’t have to lose it, we need to win it.”

Sounds like 4GW to me. Or in terms of Mao’s People’s War, the Talib/Qaeda insurgents are in Phase II: strong enough to challenge the government in small engagements but unable (as of yet) to defeat it on its own terms. As the second piece notes, at one time these guys were associates of Musharraf and ISI, who thought he could hold them in reserve against India or keep Afghanistan under Islamabad’s influence. Now that they have gotten out of control, the government can’t handle the pressure. If Peshawar’s security institutions have been demoralized, how long is it until they completely break down? Won’t the desertions from army and police forces completely erode institutional effectiveness?I find it hard to believe that Musharraf can reverse this process. Perhaps what’s needed is that Pakistan start to adopt a serious counterinsurgency strategy, one that demonstrates to the rank-and-file that the higher-ups know what they’re doing, and not just getting them killed. Instead, the military is still focused on India, and the frontier forces get shortchanged.The Musharraf factor is used up. Time for him to go, and start over. A new civilian-led democratic government may be able to make new overtures of cooperation with the United States, once the taint of Musharraf is gone. Someone has to help the Paks learn COIN. Otherwise the militants will grow stronger and simultaneously push east to Islamabad and west to Kabul. This needs to be avoided, and it needs to be addressed now.