Is manipulating identity legitimate?
Josh (who has a great blog about Language and Conflict) left this comment in response to Deconstructing the Taliban:
I winces, sorely, when you wrote that to win we need to alter their perceptions. I’m sure you didn’t mean brainwashing, but I am nearly as offended by occupying troops and by large propaganda campaigns, and I believe others are, too.
Mason and Johnson point to the 50s, 60s and 70s as a time when a) no one was on the Pashto-speaker’s backs, and b) they were at peace with the world. I welcome that again.
I can see how manipulating identity could be conceived as brainwashing. When I refer to manipulating identity, I mean using action and discourse to falsify the identity ascribed to us by the insurgency. This doesn’t mean manipulating their own identity to become American, but only to perceive shared identities between ourselves and the Pashtuns by recognizing core elements of their own identity, like Pashtunwali. This is manipulation, but identity is manipulated everyday anyway, even in non-military and non-political activities, like advertising. If there is one day to be an Afghan state that is at least neutral to the United States, someone has to do the initial political work of building that future identity. Counterinsurgency itself lays the groundwork for the greater nation building project, and so some form of manipulation is inevitable.
This doesn’t mean we can not go too far with this, we surely can. Although we are trying to manipulate identity to create friendship, we still must recognize and respect the autonomy of the individuals whom we communicate with, and ‘manipulate’. While we are using poststructural and postmodern forms of power here, they will only be successful if these individuals cooperate of their own volition and reason.
It’s nice to finally find some online writers discussing things like the content of International Security quarterly. Something tells me that if this practice was closer to the norm, there’d be far fewer troubles which result in war.
Thank you very much for the kind words about the blog and language and conflict website.
On to Afghanistan (don’t you wish, at least sometimes, that you were there?)…
I talked with someone at CFR a bit about her time in Afghanistan with USAID as part of the rebuilding effort. She doesn’t speak Pashto or any Afghan language. She told me sometimes the translators provided to her were quite bad. Bringing this back around to language and conflict, it appears to me as if the first step must be, if we hope to change someone’s mind, is to be able to speak directly to them. Maybe that is as simple as getting some Pashto speakers and hiring an advertising agency to make some really powerful billboards. Maybe not.
Either way, that is the easy way, and it can’t completely work. Because, simply, we can’t change their minds about reality they see before them. We can’t change the truth that we are occupying their country. Pashtunwali includes the idea that no one can tell an adult male what to do. I simply can’t imagine a military commander who would never tell any Pashto adult males what to do, and, quite the contrary, it is easy for me to imagine that they are constantly telling Pushtun tribesmen to get out of the way when they travel down a thoroughfare.
Let’s say, for sake of argument, that the Taliban and anti-American terrorists are given renewed energy each time a Pushtun’s honor is insulted. I’m not saying that tucking them in at night is necessary, but is any military better at the latter than the former?
By the way, the real reason I came by was to tell you about Wendt’s changing views. There is a book length, multi-author critique of his 1999 book called *Constructivism and International Relations*. Wendt has the last chapter, and he discusses how his own views have changed.
This makes it difficult to finish Social Theory of Int’l Politics!
He is moving in the direction he calls “quantum social science” and will be publishing more on it soon.
Josh,
I think it’s “changing their minds about reality they see before them” only in the sense that we present to them a reality that does not sanction the use of violence. We may be occupying that country, but it actually might serve some use for them like providing security and having a government that will leave them alone as long as they don’t grow opium. Even though we are occupying their country, they might not seek to kill us if we are associated with order, stability, and security. If other nations around the world recognize us as providing these public goods, they too will give approval of our occupation, which instead would be viewed as friendly assistance. We can’t change the ‘truth’ about us occupying their country, but through our actions and the result of them, we can alter the meaning they attach to our presence there, in technical violation of their sovereignty.
I don’t suggest that military commanders tell Pashtuns what to do. Their political moves must be of their own volition and reason, theoretically like rational actors. But, what commanders can do is affect the context of those rational decisions, and the costs and benefits that appear – or are perceived to appear – before each Pashtun elder or villager. To a greater degree, it is even possible to affect the perception of costs and benefits themselves. I think this is what critiques of rational choice theory (including Wendt) can offer to counterinsurgency operations.
To do that, we indeed all the knowledge about the Pashtuns we can gather. Right now we don’t have that capability. Maybe with Petraeus taking CENTCOM command and McKiernan getting more resources (as per withdrawl from Iraq), we might develop that ability.
Have you read it yet? Check it out when your done with Social Theory. I’ve been trying to summarize the arguments in it also. Social Theory is worth finishing though, as it problematizes the states that originally are accepted as given in Wendt 1999.
And as for Afghanistan, all I can say is that I would like to give learning Pashto a shot. Chai tea is good too.
I must be sorely misunderstanding you.
Doesn’t it seem impossible to “present to them a reality that does not sanction the use of violence” with the US and NATO militaries?
You say our occupation provides security, but, at least to some degree, Talibanization is happening faster because we are there. The old tribal leaders are being pushed aside to create a defense network with religious overtones, a defense network that would have no reason for being without U.S. airstrikes on defenseless villagers, and the U.S. military asserting the right to travel anywhere, and kill anyone, without regard for any law (have there been any charges for murder or rape in Afghanistan? The rape and murder cases in Iraq have been a joke).
As for opium, I just checked, and the map of opium production in Afghanistan shows clearly that it is lowest where the Taliban is strongest.
You say they might not want to kill us if we were associated with order, stability and security. Whose order, security and stability? We have already declared that most of these people are our enemies. They were “fine” before we got there, and I imagine most of them think they’ll be fine after we go. The problem, of course, is that their old “fine” was to live under a brutal, Afghan-supported nationalist tribal system, and their new “fine” will be a Pakistani backed religious order.
By the way, if we pull out of the region, do you think the Pakistanis who support the Taliban will increase or decrease their support? I think they would wind down operations.
As for public goods, I’d like you to even _glance_ at the ratio of military to public works expenditures in Iraq or Afghanistan. They are far more than an order of magnitude difference. Surely you think it is important to consider the ratio of public goods to military expenditures, and not just whether or not we are doing any?
I don’t think you are saying that military commanders should be violating Pashtunwali by telling the adult males what to do, but surely you agree that it happens every day? Do you think a Humvee with four soldiers is _ever_ going to pull along the side of the road to let the locals pass, or are they always going to point guns at anyone who comes close? I’ve seen enough footage and read enough newspaper accounts to know what happens in Iraq. If you don’t do exactly what we say, you get shot and killed. What sort of “perception management” might be appropriate in such an instance?
I don’t know that I’ve ever seen McKiernan speak. I hope he isn’t as dumb as most of the top U.S. Generals and Admirals, like Sanchez, Casey, Mullen and Pace. Petraeus is better, and I’m glad to see him get another promotion.
Now than I am done writing this, I’ll get back to Social Theory, at least for an hour today.
OK, I apologize for calling them dumb.
I amend that to “not nearly up to the task at hand.”
I don’t blame them, or anyone else.
It’s like how I understand the Crimean War. None of the Generals from either side had led any war against another European power, as there had been no major inter-European war in 30 years. As the totally untrustworthy wikipedia says “The Crimean War was infamously known for military and logistical incompetence.”
When was America’s last insurgency war? It ended 35 years ago! Petraeus entered service in 1974. McCain and Kerry’s experience in that war was at a very low level of command, nothing at the strategic level.
Dumb was a harsh word, in any event.
Josh,
No I don’t think we misunderstand each other. I agree that the American (and Allied) COIN effort in Afghanistan has fallen far short of expectations. I take our reliance on airpower (and the resulting civ casualties in Afghanistan) to be caused by our inability to correctly practice COIN, and information exchange with the population.
Our occupation of Afghanistan does not provide security, if it did, we would be winning that war. We need to redefine our conception of who the enemy is, and let Afghans help form that definition of the ‘enemy’. Our enemies should be there enemies, and as long as there is disagreement on that definition, we will lose the war.
We can reconclie that definition, it requires greater social interaction and learning from the Afghans, in the same way we want them to learn from our actions, and future better-executed COIN campaign.
I don’t knock McKiernan for this, he’s too new in theatre to have made any serious mistakes. Instead, our continuing neglect of Afghanistan is the problem. We get in our own way, it’s not that the mission is impossible.
I replied, but I guess my comment didn’t successfully post.
I said two things. The first, presumptuous of me, was saying that if I was in charge, every single U.S. Gov’t agent and all contractors hired by the U.S. Gov’t should get 1 hour of daily language training in any of the languages of the people of Afghanistan. Is there a Chinese trading community in Afghanistan? Maybe someone should speak Chinese, too.
I said this because you emphasized the importance of “greater social interaction and learning from the Afghans.” Any sort of meaningful rapport requires a shared language.
The second thing I said was about security. Who are we providing security against. Are Pathan tribespeople “in danger” from the Taliban? The Mason and Johnson article in Intrnational Security makes it clear that the historic tribal leadership structure is at risk, and murders are taking place to replace it with the Taleban, but I would bet that few Afghans or Pakistanis, if polled, would answer “Yes” to the question “Do you want the U.S. Armed Forces brought in to serve as a homicide squad and a anti-corruption investigative service?”
We can not provide security against the Afghans themselves. It looks to me like they are being forced into ever greater anti-American security arrangements the longer we stay around. I get the impression that I should root for the old tribal structure, and against the usurping Taliban, but the Taleban aren’t attacking America. In fact, I quite distinctly remember they _twice_ offered to hand over Osama bin-Laden, and we ignored those offers.
It might be apparent that I am not at all convinced of the legitimacy of our current role in Afghanistan. I admit to being suspicious of the motives of the Bush administration in promotig former UNOCAL consultant Karzai as ruler. I am suspect of any plan, British, Russian or American, to pacify the high mountains with anything like a traditional force.
As an aside, I saw a small hearing on defense contracting, and they had an actual servicemember up as a witness to boost one particular company’s product. Although he started out on message, when he asked a specific question, he said the device sometimes helped get Marines killed, there were extra bits that did no good, added to the cost, and limited mobility. So the defense contractor quickly talked to him privately and he came back and said it was all good. SSgt Pena, thanks for the brief window into how the desire for cash gets Americans killed.
In other words, we must recognize that there are different groups who have a vested interest in continuing wars.
One last thing, a large time-waster. It is the 1896 State of the Union of President Stephen Grover Cleveland, his last as President.
It is very different than the modern State of the Union speech, for it only discusses one topic. It looks at the situation from both sides of the problem, not just mentioning useful facts. It even criticizes some few American citizens.
American Interests in the Cuban Revolution
I don’t know of a better speech that concentrates so firmly on insurgent war, and on the logic of keeping out of a foreign civil war.
Josh,
Agreed on language training, its conceptual importance is spreading rapidly as well[1], especially after videos like this[2].
I suspect you are not alone regarding the legitimacy of the Afghanistan project, as the sad truth is we have never committed the necessary resources to Afghanistan that would signal we were serious about nation building. Instead we were blinded by ideology and invaded Iraq.
Cuba is an example of how not to get involved in foreign internal politics, as is Iran. Real political leadership might actually lead to a successful policy of assisting those states.
[1] Kip @ AM, ‘Notes from Anbar’. http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/07/notes-from-anbar.html
[2] ‘Lost in Translation’. The Guardian, UK. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2008/jun/11/afghanistan.johndmchugh
Wow, those are fantastic links, illustrating exactly what I am talking about, generally, with specifics on two important wars.
Of course, those two are just about occupation. What I think I see is that the issue goes to governance generally, that a Uzbek speaking town faced with a Pashto or Hazara language Afghan Police or Army unit will face the same problems. That the Uzbek speaker will not be able to read the law of their own country. That communities which do not share a means of communication, over time, will drift apart. That if the drift is far enough, war can be the result. And that the distance between languages is measured both in how alien they are from each other (English is like German, not as much like Spanish, and far from Arabic) and whatever translations have already occurred.
All this talk has me thinking. If we meet extra-terrestrials, and they have, per expectations, an alien language, what would we want translated first? A first guess is that it would be something we were proud of, something that is an important constitutional element of our society.
I might be inclined to point to Hegel, just to show off and make them think we are smarties. Of course, I really like Montesquieu, and I see him as the Oracle of the American Republic.
http://satp.blogspot.com/2005/01/dumb-post.html
I know which book Bush would pick
Josh,
Interesting thinking about aliens. What would a first encounter look like?
And thanks for the link from your blog!
[...] (Major hat tip to Stephen Pampinella) [...]