Movin’ On Up
Petraeus to Be Nominated to Lead Central Command.
Odierno comes full circle and gets MNF-I.
Diplomatic manuevers, COIN in Sadr City
Confirming Dan’s comment in the last post, Iran has turned away from supporting Moqtada al-Sadr and instead now sides with the Maliki government. But, this apparently had more to do with the insecurity in Basra caused by the Sadrists rather than their presence in Sadr City, noted at the end of the article. Now that the Iraqi Army has taken the last Sadrist positions in Basra, the fighting in the capital has taken center stage.
There is some attempt to win over the population in Sadr City. A wall is being erected around the Tharwa and Jamilla districts to keep out insurgents and begin reconstruction. But apparently the Maliki government forgot to plan for that reconstruction thing. How surprising:
The Iraqi government has long had difficulties improving services for its citizens, but the delay in mounting reconstruction efforts in Sadr City is complicating the American strategy to thwart the area’s militias and halt the mortars and missiles that had been fired from its streets toward the fortified Green Zone…
Indeed, the Mahdi Army, the militia founded by Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric who holds sway here, has long used the delivery of aid and basic services as a means of building political influence.
“Through a ‘Hezbollah-like’ scheme, the Shiite Sadrist movement has established itself as the main service provider in the country,” notes a recent report by Refugees International, an advocacy group. “As a result of the importance of nonstate actors in the delivery of assistance and security, civilians are joining militias.”
This is where the real competition begins. If Maliki wants to run with the ball, he (and the government) has to do reconstruction now. Sadr has always had a base of support because he can deliver social services. This is the same strategy perfected by Hezbollah and Hamas. The government has to prove that it can out-compete Sadr in service delivery and win over the population.
“A political spring”
Secretary Rice can be ignored for her hyperbole (remember the birth pangs of a new Middle East WRT Lebanon?).
But is it possible that the Iraqi offensive against the Sadrists could yield new stability?
I’ve always argued (via Noah Feldman) that political stability in Iraq would be the result of a cross-sectarian governing coalition between Sunnis and Shiites. I originally thought that this was more likely between Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sunnis and not the Maliki government, which is backed by Dawa and ISCI, both heavily pro-Iranian. Turns out, the Sunnis and Maliki can cut their own deal. From the Washington Post:
“Hopefully, this will be the first step to accept and accommodate al-Sahwah after months of pushing to address this issue,” Hashimi said, using the Arabic word meaning “the awakening” for the CLCs. “I think we have reached a turning point. Either we go ahead and make this program sustainable for the future and encourage people to shoulder the responsibility to fight the takfiris,” he said, referring to religious extremists, “or the whole process will collapse and the government will be held responsible for the consequences.”
Tariq al-Hashemi is one of Iraq’s two vice president, and the only Sunni representative. He has otherwise been highly critical of the Maliki government, but since the offensive against the Sadrists, Hashemi has sided squarely with the Prime Minister:
Tariq al-Hashemi, the Sunni Arab vice-president, has signed off on a statement by Jalal Talabani, the country’s Kurdish president, and Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the Shia vice-president, that expressed support for al-Maliki’s Basra crackdown.
The statement was significant as al-Hashemi has been one of al-Maliki’s most bitter critics.
If true, it becomes possible that the Sunni-Shiite governing coalition is between Maliki and the Sunnis, and not Sadr and the Sunnis. If so, this would be a restoration of some form of unity government between all sects of the country, and if Maliki does satisfy Hashemi’s requests regarding the incorpation of the CLCs into the security forces, it could lead to a truly cross-sectarian mix of security personnel that wouldn’t be defined solely by being Sunni or Shiite. Lacking a threat from either, and instead cooperating, they could interact as Iraqis once again.
But, if the Sunni-Shiite coalition excludes Sadr, what should he do? If Maliki is serious about banning Sadr from politics altogether, then the only rational response from him is to fight to the death:
Anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr gave a “final warning” to the government Saturday to halt a U.S.-Iraqi crackdown against his followers or he would declare “open war until liberation.”
A cross-sectarian coalition could be forged on the backs of the Sadrists. But, if they do decide to go on the offensive, will it even be worth it? The Sadrists will not be simply run of Iraq. They will lay low, consolidate, and Hizbollahize into a mini-army of loyalists. The Iranians will still support them because it makes us look weaker, at the same time supporting the government backed by Dawa-ISCI (their real proxies in-country). A cross-sectarian governing coalition will emerge, but Iraq might still be unstable because it excludes the Sadrists.
To be completely honest, I have no idea anymore which way this goes. Too many uncertain possibilities that cannot be simply explained in the media.
ISF Order of Battle
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/iraqi_security_force_12.php
Expect a post later today on the Sadrists apparent defeat and signs of Sunni support of Maliki.
Long Warrior
New blog by TT Carnahan. Why is it that all these mil bloggers write in the third person? Don’t worry though, Steveo’s down with that.
The Endgame
After five years, we are still trying to ‘win’ in Iraq by invading city neighborhoods and killing ‘criminals’ or ‘terrorists’. Instead of Sunnis, now it’s Sadrists who are the main culprits. We back a government that represents a minority of the Iraqi population, a faction that is more closely aligned to Iran than any other, and probably doesn’t even have a majority in Parliament. Is it really dreaming to think that one day, the Iraqi National Assembly can sack its Prime Minister, bring down the government, and restore a new one with a stable majority? (You know, like normal parliamentary democracy)
We can imagine that a stable Iraqi government would be backed by both Sunnis and Shi’a, and would recognize the primacy of an Iraqi national identity rather than their sectarian counterparts. Militarily, Iraqi security forces would be supreme: militias would be relegated to a secondary status and would not be singled out for favoritism or repression. They would be treated equally, as long as they obeyed the law.
Instead, the story goes something like this: Sadrists are under attack because they have a militia that contributes to instability. But the Iraqi government (and Iraqi Security Forces) is heavily dependent on the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) and its militia, the Badr Brigade. The latest operation into Basra was not about law and order, it was about supporting the ISCI-Dawa (Maliki’s party) agenda to win in the provincial elections in October, in which the Sadrists may do very well. Maliki now is threatening to block the Sadrists from politics all together unless he disbands his militia.
After five years of state building, the result thus far is a government that is used by one militia to wipe out another. We are no longer operating along counterinsurgency doctrine as elaborated by Petraeus, Nagl, Kilcullen, etc. The Sadrists know (in their own minds) that we support ISCI-Dawa which uses the government to make them insecure. In no way will resolve itself peacefully, unless you killed all the Sadrists.
This is the ultimate failure of the Surge. A military solution without a political one leaves too much accounted for. While the Surge has contributed to some peace in Iraq by coopting former enemies, the ISCI-Dawa assault on the Sadrists is itself the source of the renewed turmoil – Maliki is now part of the problem. It’s time keep an eye open for the possibility of the fall of his government. Certainly this is risky (what if no government is reformed, wouldn’t that be state failure?), but we have painted ourselves into a strategic corner. Now that we are truly, completely, and utterly out of options, it’s time to let go of the reins, and hit the road.
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